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The purpose of this paper is to propose a hypothesis to 
illuminate Ortega's critical response to Heidegger's question of 
being (Seinsfrage). While Ortega integrated the classical 
requirements for the idea of Being into his idea of human life 
as radical reality, Heidegger's delineation of human life 
(Dasein) was only preliminary to the final philosophical task 
of understanding the question of Being itself (Sein) as the 
transcendent horizon for human life. For Ortega human life is 
not merely a preliminary ontology that points to another 
transcendent reality, but final reality itself. I shall argue here 
that: (1) Ortega saw Heidegger's Seinsfrage as both empty and 
dead-ended as a philosophical enterprise; (2) by Heidegger's 
refusal to understand human life and its circumstances as the 
final goal of philosophy, he failed to account for the reality of 
human life in its circumstantial, historical, and methodological 
dimensions; and (3) Heidegger's philosophical project results 
in a frozen and metaphysical concept of human nature that 
transceDds the historicality of humanity's actual existence and 
artificially bifurcates history into opposed metaphysical and 
empirical dimensions that only Ortega's doctrine of historical 
reason can synthesize. 
While Ortega rightly resisted any suggestion that he was 
Heidegger's disciple, he admitted "with pleasure" that 
Heidegger's genius had penetrated the question of human 
existence to profound depths.1 Still, Ortega claimed that there 
were few major Heideggerean themes that had not appeared in 
Ortega's own work at least in seminal form prior to the 
publication of Sein und Zeit in 1927. Ortega, like Heidegger, 
devoted critical attention to the problem and application of 
Being in his own writings. It is to this issue that I will now 
turn. 
After 1929, Ortega began to argue that philosophy must 
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return to first principles, and one such is Being itself. While 
Ortega saw much in classical ontology as flawed and while he 
often treated the idea of Being as humankind's attempt to create 
a sort of hypothetical-fictional category by which to identify 
the possibilities of things and circumstances, he also wanted to 
understand Being as that which is preeminently real without 
qualifications, as that which really is (C5vtos C5n). He clearly 
ascribed this classical sense of Being to human life as radical 
reality because our life is the ground in which all other 
realities do and must appear.2 
With at least this preliminary sketch in mind, I can now 
advance to Heidegger's conception of the Being question 
(Seinsfrage) and to Ortega's critique of it. While Ortega did not 
develop at length a theoretical critique of Heidegger's doctrine 
of Being, I want to propose in this essay that his remarks on 
Heidegger in The Idea of Principle in Leibniz and the Evolution 
of Deductive Theory reflect Ortega's profound concerns and 
reservations about the goals and capacities of Heidegger's 
thought, and especially the problem of Being. For Ortega, 
Heidegger's Being question remains unclarified, undeveloped, 
and problematically related to Ortega's own idea of human life 
as radical reality.3 In order to understand these remarks, it 
must be remembered that in Sein und Zeit Heidegger posed the 
question of the meaning of Being (der Sinn des Sein (jberhaupt) 
as his deepest and central concern. The subtitle of his book is 
"The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the 
Explication of Time as the Trancendental Horizon for the 
Question of Being." This subtitle indicates that the doctrine of 
human life (Dasein) was only of preliminary importance to his 
final goal. For Heidegger, the term Sein is meant to refer to 
that transcendent condition that makes entities (Seiendes) 
present and possible. His inquiry into Being, then, belongs to 
the domain of final ontology, but his explication of the being of 
humankind (Dasein) belongs to preliminary ontology because 
the analysis of Dasein is only the initial means through which 
Heidegger approaches final Being (Sein). 
Speaking now to the first of Ortega's reservations about 
Heidegger's Being question-that it is unfruitful and empty for 
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the philosophical enterprise-Ortega noted that Heidegger's 
technical term Dasein replaced the more natural expression 
"human life." Heidegger's understanding of human life as 
there-being (Dasein) indicates that Dasein is but a secondary 
aspect of and prelude to the understanding of Being itself 
(Seinsverstandnis). For Ortega, Heidegger's project was but a 
revival of the medieval Ens, a term for Being that he extended 
into a new typology termed Dasein. For Ortega, in addition, any 
acceptable doctrine of Being as radical reality must refer to 
human life. But Heidegger strongly rejected the understanding 
of human life as final ontology, for such a project would never 
distinguish between preliminary ontology as such and the final 
ontological quest for Being itself. Life philosophy, he claimed, 
does not belong to the domain of fundamental ontology, nor is it 
the proper goal of philosophical thinking.4 Thus, in one stroke 
Heidegger's metaphysics attempted to eliminate the life 
philosophy project of Wilhelm Dilthey and subsequently 
Ortega's idea of human life as fundamental reality. 
I would hypothesize that the philosophical basis of 
Ortega's criticism of both Heidegger's Being question and 
subsequent philosophical enterprise has now been located. The 
whole status and legitimacy of Ortega's idea of human life was 
being defended behind his relatively brief critical remarks on 
Heidegger in his Leibniz. Further, Heidegger's search was only 
a "furor teutonicus" that is directed to a concept that transcends 
the radical reality of human life and disjoins the 
phenomenal-circumstantial reality of human life as Ortega 
conceived it from the transcendent reality of Being itself 
(Sein). Heidegger's Being has a tendency to evaporate into a 
hidden status above human life and its circumstances. This 
concept adds nothing of phenomenal, methodological, or 
ontological import to his already completed analysis of Oasein. 
Indeed, human life has been here left with a problematical and 
undeveloped relation to Heidegger's Being (Sein). 
The second problem generated by Heidegger's rejection of 
life philosophy as fundamental ontology is that it forces the 
neglect of grasping human existence in its explanatory, 
epistemological, empirical, and methodological dimensions. The 
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understanding of Dasein as merely preliminary to the question 
of final Being relegates the above dimensions to a merely 
factual and sub-ontological status below Heidegger's criteria 
for authentic philosophical endeavor. For example, in Sein und 
Zeit Heidegger treated the historicality of Oasein 
(Geschichtlichkeit) as the prime existential foundation for the 
possibility of the human and historical studies (Geistes-
wissenschaften). By historicality, Heidegger meant to indicate 
that humanity is ab initio a historical being, that is, a temporal 
existence that arises from a past and projects its possibilities 
into the future. This historicality is a primarily historical 
form of human being because it is the ontological condition or 
basis for the historical sciences (Historie). But the factical-
phenomenal sciences of history, along with their empirical 
methods, records, and artifacts, Heidegger designated as only 
"secondarily historical" because they take their significance 
only from the primary historicality of Dasein, to whose world 
they meaningfully belong and for whom they are "to hand" 
(Zuhandensein). In this sense, empirical history is not founded 
upon facts and their relation to an isolated knower, but on a 
hermeneutical situation, that is, on a world of previously 
existing significance for Oasein. Heidegger's analysis has then 
revealed the ontological ground of the historical sciences 
through his analysis of human being, but his thought fails to 
address the question of how the methods, materials, and 
questions of the historical sciences are formulated into a 
generally valid empirical enterprise. This lacuna occurs, I 
believe, because his philosophical project understands Oasein 
only as a species of ontology that is subsidiary to the final 
question of Being. Consequently, the merely factual, 
explanatory status of the methods and materials of the 
historical sciences are only "secondary." Subsequently, these 
issues are not deemed relevant to fundamental philosophy, and 
they are mentioned in connection with the analYSis of Dasein 
only in so far as Dasein is the metaphysical ground of the 
phenomenal-empirical sciences of humankind.5 The question 
of Dasien is not developed in a phenomenal, empirical, or 
methodological direction, but as a subordinate prelude to the 
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final metaphysical question of Being (Sein). 
From the perspective of Ortega's idea of life as radical 
reality, however, such a subordination and misdirection of the 
philosophical enterprise misunderstands the fundamentality of 
human life and disjoins its profound fusion with its actual 
methodological, empirical, and historical circumstances; and 
the radical reality of human life is etherealized away from 
phenomenal circumstances to transcendent Being. The result is 
that methodological-epistemological questions, the explanatory 
status of collectives, laws and institutions, and causal-
empirical questions are demoted by Heidegger to a sort of 
sub-ontological "naturalism" appropriate only to life 
philosophy. This is the case even though he had accepted from 
Dilthey's thought the historicality of humanity. Heidegger's 
ontological project excluded consideration of the logical-
empirical status of history and the Naturwissenschaften and the 
Geisteswissenschaften generally, of systems theory, ideal 
types, and the Verstehen method.6 I believe that Heidegger here 
has anticipated Gadamer's later claim that such issues are only 
"naturalistic," "secondary," and prone to the evils of 
historicism, an issue to which I must now turn as the third and 
final problem. 
For Heidegger, historicism referred to the denial of the 
permanence of human nature and to the affirmation that 
humanity's being is defined by the variety of its differing 
expressions in historical time. Heidegger's work replaced the 
concept of human nature as substance or "entity to hand" 
(Vorhandensein) by a metaphysical thesis about the ontological 
structure of human being (Dasein). This structure must be 
understood prior to the understanding of Being itself. It 
remains in the timeless mode of metaphysics and constitutes, he 
believed, a refutation of historicist and life philosophy's 
attempt to dissolve a fixed, metaphysical human nature. It is an 
alienation of humanity's authentic historical Being, he claimed, 
to understand human nature as an a~gregate product of history 
and as changing in historical time. For Heidegger, human 
nature as elaborated in the existential structure of Dasein 
remains constant in historical time; otherwise the Dasein-
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analysis of Sein und Zeit would be undermined as a 
metaphysical enterprise. In this sense the existential 
constitution of Dasein is transhistorical. But for Ortega 
nothing in human existence is transhistorical: humanity itself 
is its history. The reality of human life in history and 
circumstances-that area addressed by the sub-philosophical 
sciences in Heidegger's world-must never be separated from a 
viable understanding of human being in time. Human life is 
always fused with its phenomenal circumstances, and as such it 
is a species temporis and never a species aeternitatis that can 
be delineated apart from the actuality of vital, phenomenal, and 
problematic circumstances. These considerations suggest that 
humanity has no fixed nature. What we have is our history. 
Humanity as history is the true reality of human experience. 
The reality of one's life's actual history is not derived from 
abstract or historically transcendent reality. One's past is all 
one has.8 
In the autochthonous human reality of one's actual 
history, humanity has no transcendent nature. Humankind is a 
historical "drama" of what each one has done and made of 
oneself, of what each has constructed and been capable of. The 
being of human life is an accumulation of being, an absolute 
presence that cannot be separated from the understanding of 
one's actual circumstances. Human life and its transformation 
in time is the formula for reality, and while this formula 
denies any essentialist thesis, it does not deny a coherent 
identity to homo sapiens. As an identity in difference one's real 
being is one's life in time and circumstances-nothing more. 
This, rather than the distinction between a permanent human 
nature and a nature that has no identifiable being, is the 
intention of Ortega's thought. Ortega's "new being" is the 
reconceptualization of human life in phenomenal-temporal 
circumstances; and humanity's new organon that explicates 
such a being is one's vital and historical reason. With his 
theory of vital and historical reason as adjuncts to the idea of 
life, Ortega avoided the Heideggerean bracketing of the 
circumstantial, empirical, and methodological realms. Not only 
do the human studies provide perspectives on human life, but 
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vital and historical reason are constitutents of this reality 
itself. Thus Heidegger's omission of a viable theory of 
explanatory reason was rectfied in Ortega's work. Historical 
reason provides a narrative account of human life in historical 
circumstances by synthesizing the choices, creations, actions, 
and circumstances of our existence with the radical reality of 
human life. In this sense human life is never disjoined from 
the "secondary" empirical, phenomenal, and epistemological 
elements that are required for any viable theory of human life 
as final reality. Ortega's thought released the doctrine of final 
Being from its "dead-end" status in Heidegger. At least I 
believe that this perspective of his thinking helps to iluminate 
Ortega's negative reception of Heidegger's doctrine of Sein. 
Whether we speak of The Revolt of the Masses, 
Invertebrate Spain, Man and People, Man and Crises, The 
Mission of the University, An Interpretation of Universal 
History, or Historical Reason, Ortega's mission was to reveal 
the circumstances and possibilities of the reality of life in its 
factical historicality. I believe, in summary, that it is this 
concern that prompted Ortega's critical response to Heidegger's 
doctrine of Being. I also believe that Heidegger's now-famous 
interview with Der Spiegel in the late 1960s would exemplify 
the grounds of Ortega's concern. When he was asked about the 
future of human life with respect to a holocaust, over-
population, and the environment, Heidegger replied, "Only a god 
can save us." This answer was not arbitrary or posed. Rather, 
it was the statement of. the later Heidegger, who too much 
separated his search for reality from human life and its 
circumstances. Humanity must wait passively for the 
revelation of Being (Sein) in Heidegger's late philosophy. Here 
Ortega's emphasis on the responsibility for the making of 
humanity and history seems entirely forgotten, and the 
actuality of historical drift is more or less accepted. But, for 
Ortega, "man is the sight of Divinity." Humankind is the Being 
who is responsible for the future of the radical reality of 
human life. The adequate understanding of this demanding 
condition is for Ortega "the dawn of historical reason." 
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